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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-1351 
 ___________ 
 
 GANGADEI PARBHU RAMRUP, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 




 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (BIA No. A99-139-910) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Alberto J. Riefkohl 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2010 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed    November 10,  2010  ) 
 ___________ 
 




Gangadei Parbhu Ramrup seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 




the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Petitioner Gangadei Parbhu Ramrup, a citizen of Guyana, entered the United 
States in 2001 as a non-immigrant visitor.  She failed to depart, and in 2006, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings.  Ramrup 
applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection only, because an application for 
asylum would have been untimely.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2). 
Ramrup testified that the two main ethnic groups in Guyana, the majority Afro-
Guyanese and the minority Indo-Guyanese, are in constant conflict.  The Afro-Guyanese 
control most of the government, including the military and the police.  The Indo-
Guyanese, represented by the People’s Progressive Party (“PPP”), have control of the 
presidency.  Ramrup, an Indo-Guyanese, was self-employed before leaving Guyana.  She 
acted as a poll worker during the 1997 elections, during which there were outbreaks of 
violence between the two ethnic groups.  Ramrup testified that she fears she will be 
targeted if returned to Guyana.  She also claims that she will suffer significant economic 
harm, because jobs are generally not available to Indo-Guyanese. 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found her testimony credible, and recognized that 
the State Department’s 2001 Country Report for Guyana corroborated her claims about 
the ethnic tensions and the high levels of poverty in the country.  Nevertheless, the IJ 




application for withholding of removal, and granted her application for voluntary 
departure.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed her appeal.  Ramrup 
filed a timely petition for review. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  
Where, as here, the BIA adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the bases for 
the IJ’s opinion, this Court will review both opinions.  See Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 
242 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review factual findings for substantial evidence, see Briseno-
Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007), upholding them “unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B); see also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).    
III. 
Ramrup claims that the IJ and BIA wrongly determined that she failed to meet her 
burden of proof that she would more likely than not suffer harm, including economic 
harm, if returned to Guyana.  To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must 
establish that it is more likely than not that her “life or freedom would be threatened in 
th[e] country [of removal] because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Tarrawally 
v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003).  To meet the stringent standard for 




persecution is “more likely than not” to occur upon removal.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); 
Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). 
We agree that Ramrup failed to prove a well-founded fear of persecution.
1
  The 
violence that envelops Guyana during elections and Ramrup’s prior political activity do 
not establish that she will be personally targeted for persecution.  See Myat Thu v. Att’y 
Gen., 510 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 2007) (“generally harsh conditions shared by many 
other persons do not amount to persecution”) (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 
(3d Cir. 1993)).  Ramrup never stated that she was a member of the PPP, just that she was 
a poll worker.  She presented no evidence that anyone in Guyana has a particular interest 
in her or her prior activities.   
Likewise, Ramrup’s claim that, as a member of the minority Indo-Guyanese 
population, she will face persecution also fails.  Racial and ethnic tensions and 
discrimination do not necessarily denote persecution.  See Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 
214, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2003) (widespread legal and economic discrimination against 
Palestinians in Saudi Arabia does not constitute persecution).  Her claim that she will 
face economic persecution because of her ethnicity is also unsupported.  “[D]eliberate 
imposition of severe economic disadvantage which threatens a petitioner’s life or 
freedom may constitute persecution.”  Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2005).  
                                                 
1
Ramrup did not contest on appeal to the BIA whether the IJ erred in determining that she 
failed to demonstrate past persecution, nor does she now claim that she suffered past 




Economic discrimination is insufficient.  See Ahmed, 341 F.3d at 217-18.  Ramrup did 
not present any evidence that she will be deliberately targeted for any reason.  See Li, 400 
F.3d at 168.  Accordingly, the evidence presented does not compel a conclusion contrary 
to the IJ’s and BIA’s. 
Finally, the record is devoid of any evidence that would render Ramrup eligible 
for CAT protection, as she fails to show that it is more likely than not that she will face 
torture if removed to Guyana.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
